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ZASTOSOWANIE METOD STEGANOGRAFICZNYCH DO ATAKÓW 
W SYSTEMACH INFORMACYJNO-KOMUNIKACYJNYCH 
Streszczenie. W artykułe został przedstawiony przegląd istniejących i potencjalnie dostępnych technik steganograficznych, które mogą zostać użyte jako 
narzędzia do ataków na systemy informacyjne i komunikacyjne. Podano możliwe sposoby zapewnienia ochrony przed takimi atakami. 
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Introduction 
Cryptography is widely used as one of the most efficient and 
approbated methods of critical information resources protection. 
Nevertheless, in particular cases it might be more effective 
to hide the communication channel itself instead of making 
the information within it unreadable. Such a practice, namely 
– concealing data within unsuspicious, innocent-looking 
containers – is called steganography. 
While being primarily considered a means of information 
security assurance, steganography can be used with ill intentions, 
as well. In fact, several high-tech attacks are based on the hidden 
data transmission, and contemporary methods of counteraction 
do not provide satisfactory level of resilience to those. The main 
advantage of steganography becomes the main source 
of threat – the channels of the attack, not to mention information 
about the attacker left in the channels, cannot be identified due to 
the nature of the method. In other words, attacks become invisible, 
as does the transmission channel. Even the fact of trespassing 
cannot be easily proven.  
The purpose of this article is to conduct an analysis of attacks 
that are carried out with the use of steganography methods as their 
basis, and are directed against information and communication 
systems. Both existing and potential methods are presented. 
1. Steganography as a means of hiding 
information 
1.1. Basic terminology 
Steganography is an art and science of storing and transferring 
secret messages within covert channels that are based on and 
created inside open channels in such a way that the cover data is 
perceived as if not having any embedded messages for its 
unplanned recipients.  
The main concepts are: 
 Container b (also: carrier) is open data used to conceal secret 
information. 
 Message m (also: payload) is secret information to be 
concealed. 
 Key k is secret information that is known only to a legitimate 
user and defines a specific concealment algorithm. 
 Empty container c (also: unmodified container) is a container 
devoid of any secret data; it is a sequence of lc-long elements. 
 Modified container s (also: package, steganogramme) is the 
one that contains a secret message. 
 Steganographic algorithm means two transforms, a direct F: 
M x B x K → B and an inverse one F–1: B x K → M. 
 Steganographic system (also: steganosystem) is a totality of 
messages, secret keys, containers and transforms that connect 
them [8, 13]. 
Most steganography methods are based on two key principles: 
 Human senses cannot distinguish slight changes in colour, 
shape and sound perception. 
 Consequently, there are files that do not demand absolute 
preciseness and therefore can be modified without losing their 
functional value. 
As a result, said methods imply allocation of insignificant 
fragments of the container and replacement of the information 
within them with information that needs to be hidden. 
Finally, the process of encoded steganogramme detection 
is called steganoanalysis. 
1.2. Popular steganographic solutions 
In this section the brief overview of widely used 
steganographic solutions is presented.  
Mostly, steganography uses the data concealment within 
digital images and audio files, less so video files and text. 
Electronic communications may also include hiding data inside 
of a transport layer (program or protocol) [6].  
Starting with non-digital methods, physical steganography 
technics cannot be omitted. They have been developing 
for centuries and include, for example, blinking one’s eyes 
in Morse code to spell a secret message [10]. 
Another example is adding tiny yellow dots to each page 
while printing a document. They are not detectable by the bare eye 
and contain the model, serial number and timestamps. This 
information cannot be obtained from a computer file and  
is embedded in a printout using dot-matrix code. The technology 
is used by many brand color laser printers, such as Xerox and 
Hewlett-Packard for traceability reasons [12].  
Methods of embedding data within an image container are [5, 8]: 
 Least Significant Bit method (LSB) (Sequential Insertion) is 
the most popular steganographic method. The least siginficant 
bit of each pixel is in fact a noise. If it is changed, the 
difference in the image will not be noticed by a human eye. 
Thus, these bits can be replaced with the bits of a secret 
message.  
 LSB Psuedo Random Insertion. In contrast to the previous 
method, in which every changed data bit follows the next, this 
method uses pseudo random distribution of the secret message 
bits through the container. Thus, the interval between two bits 
is pseudo-randomly defined, which complicates both visual 
and statistical attacks, as well as extraction of all the hidden 
bits.  
 Block hiding method. The container is split into disjoint 
blocks; for each of them a parity bit is calculated. One secret 
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bit is concealed within one block. If the parity bit does not 
equal the respective secret bit, then one of the LSB 
in the block is inverted, so that the parity and the secret bits 
are the same. 
 Palette permutation. Any colour palette consists of pairs 
of indexes. Each pixel of the image correspondsto a certain 
index in the table. The sequence of colours in the palette is not 
important, so it is possible to conceal a covert message by 
changing this sequence. 
 Koch-Zhao (Relative DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) 
values change method). Initial image is split into blocks 
of 88 pixels. As the result of applying DCT to every block 
a table of DCT coefficients is formed. Every secret bit is 
hidden in a separate block. Frequencies quantization causes 
some rate of distortion in the image, which is still not 
noticeable by the human eye. 
 Benham-Memon-Yeo-Yeung method. Optimized version 
of the previous method. Firstly, only the most suitable blocks 
are used. Secondly, three DCT coefficients are selected 
instead of two, which decreases destortion in the container. 
 Fridrich method implies a cascade embedment in low- and 
high-frequency DCT coefficients. 
 Spread-Spectrum method consits of three possible variants: 
o The used frequency band is much wider than needed; 
o Spectrum is expanded by using a special independed (also: 
code) signal. The signal energy is distributed through all 
frequency bands, which makes the signal noise immune; 
o Restoration of the initial information is carried out 
by comparing the received signal and a synchronized copy 
of the code signal. 
 Embedding pictures within video-files [10]. 
Audio steganography [8]: 
 LSB-method for audio-files is the same as for images, but 
working with the audio-file format. It causes considerable 
destortions in the container. 
 Phase coding method implies the substitution of the initial 
sound segment phase with the reference phase, which is the 
data to be concealed. Phases of adjacent segments are agreed 
to preserve the difference phase between them. 
 Echo-signal use. Data is embedded in the container by 
injecting an echo-signal in it. Three echo-signal parameters are 
changed: initial amplitude, attenuation and shear rate. The 
echo-signal is perceived only as an additional resonance [4]. 
Linguistic steganography [8]: 
 Random interval methods. Changing the number of spaces in 
the end of the text string does not cause significant changes in 
the meaning of the sentence. What is more, an average reader 
is unlikely to detect insignificant space modifications: 
o Changing the interval between sentences. One or two 
additional spaces are added after the sentence. 
o Changing the number of spaces in the end of text lines. 
Spaces are added according to the secret bit to be hidden. 
Two spaces encode one bit a line, four spaces – two bits 
etcetera. 
o Changing the number of spaces between words in a 
flattened text. When the text is width aligned, spaces 
between words are not of the same length and some of 
them can be used to hide data. 
 Making the text of the same colour as the background [10]. 
 Using similarly looking Unicode and ASCII characters [2, 6]. 
 Using non-printable Unicode characters [2]. 
 Creating a pattern of deliberate errors and/or marked 
corrections [6]. 
Some other methods: 
 Converting a file so that it has the statistical characteristics of 
another one [6]. 
 Format steganography. 
 Blog-steganography. Secret data is added as commentary pin 
boards on social networks [10]. 
Finally, there are different software applications that use the 
methods of steganographic concealment mentioned above: 
Using LSB-method: OutGuess, JSTEG, JPHS, Hide-and-Seek, 
Steganos, Steghide, DC-Stegano. 
Using the palette permutation: Gifshuffle. 
JPEG format: OutGuess, JSTEG, JPHS. 
GIF format: Gifshuffle, Hide-and-Seek. 
BMP format: Steganos, Steghide. 
PCX format: DC-Stegano. 
LSB-method in audio-files: Invisible secrets, Hide4PGP, Steghide, 
StegoWav, Steghan, S-Tools. 
Using parity of quantization of frequency coefficients: MP3Stego. 
Using incorrect frames in a compressed stream: UnderMP3Cover 
[1]. 
There are also several perspective steganography methods, the 
use of which is still limited, but nevertheless possible [11]: 
1) Internet of Things and cyber-physical systems. A cyber-
physical system is a mechanism that is controlled or monitored 
by computer-based algorithms, tightly integrated with the Internet 
and its users. Examples of CPS are autonomous automobile 
systems, medical monitoring, smart grids, automatic pilot avionics 
etc. The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical 
devices, vehicles and other items embedded with electronics, 
sensors, software and network connectivity, which enable them to 
collect and exchange data. It is more or less an instance of a class 
of cyber-physical systems. The network steganography uses 
communication protocols’ control elements and their functionality 
to hide information inside. The modifications can be carried out 
either over a single network protocol (applied to the Protocol Data 
Unit, the time relations between PDUs or both) or to several 
protocols at the same time (inter-protocol steganography). Such 
network steganography methods can be applied to the systems 
mentioned above, too. The IoT is believed to be a phenomenon 
that will expand its influence greatly within the next few years. 
As a perspective network instance it requires thorough attention 
of steganography specialists. Information circulates within 
it the same or the fairly similar way as in any other system. Thus, 
optimal and the most suitable methods of hiding data in 
communication protocols should be developed specifically for the 
IoT. What is more, as the items within the IoT possess a vast 
variety of sensors and software, they can be used to conceal data 
in. For example, covert messages can be stored in unused registers 
of the CPS/IoT components or in the states of their actuators. 
2) The use of stream containers. As mentioned above, by the type 
of access to the data one can distinguish fixed and stream 
containers. All the methods mentioned in Chapter 2.3 use the first 
ones to conceal information in. Such a container is a constant 
pre-defined sequence of bits that are displayed before a 
steganographer all at once. To the contrary, a stream container is a 
sequence of bits that are continuously changing, as in a phone 
conversation. A message is embedded in real time so that the final 
size of the container is never known beforehand. The intervals 
between the embedded bits are generated by a pseudorandom 
sequence (PRS) generator and uniformly distributed between 
readouts. There is hardly a couple of scientific works devoted to 
this type of steganography, let alone examples of its real-life 
practical implementation. Despite any reasons, it can be 
successfully applied as an efficient means of information security. 
There is a number of solutions for encrypted secure real-time 
communication. However, what if we could, for example, make 
a confidential phone conversation not only indecipherable but also 
seem to be an innocent chat? A stenographic telephone set-top box 
could be a solution. The same concerns video-conferences. 
An extraneous observer would only see an average conversation 
not having any access to the real audio, video or any other 
embedded data. The unpopularity of the stream-container 
steganography can be explained by defining major issues 
concerning its use. First and foremost, it is never known whether 
the size of the container will be enough to conceal the whole 
message as the length of the first (and likely of the latter, as well) 
is undefined. The same property creates and advantage as one 
carrier file can be capacious enough to contain several messages. 
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In any case, the secret data has to be somehow synchronized with 
the container, thus one of the biggest questions is how to define 
the beginning and the end of the embedded sequence within the 
container. The problem becomes more serious concerning video 
communication. The solution would be of extreme complexity, as 
we would need to synchronize the image-image stream (both open 
and covert), the sound-sound stream and image and sound 
respectively. The solution may lie in using special built-in 
libraries. They would consist of structured groups of words of the 
same length, which would in ideal case possess pronunciation 
similarities. Such groups should then be grouped in semantic 
dictionaries, so that they would form simple, but logically and 
semantically structured sentences. The linguistic means for this 
are well-developed and are similar to those of forming synonymic 
dictionaries and machine translation applications. The words and 
sentences could then be synchronized with the container using 
synchronization bits, package headers and/or other means 
of dividing encapsulated data; the covert message can be 
embedded after them and be synchronized using the initial 
properties of the container.The possible situations with video 
communication would be more complex. If only the content 
of a given  conversation is confidential, then the issue is just 
to steganographically encrypt the sound and synchronize it with 
the real video image. On the other hand, if the identities 
of conversation participants are also a secret, then other methods 
should be provided. It is not necessary for a steganographic 
solution to be all-purpose. It is possible to design a system 
consisting of a cryptographic and a steganographic modules and 
providing different scenarios according to the situation. The 
biggest remaining problem is a significant delay which is 
unacceptable in real-time conversations. Then again, there are 
numerous solutions in cryptography in this field, that can be 
adapted to the task. 
2. Steganography methods used as instruments 
for attacks 
2.1. Format steganography 
Perhaps, the easiest and the most well-known way, which 
is actually a steganography method, is using legitimate features 
of file formats to carry hidden malicious software within their 
structure. A file of every format contains specific fields, which 
ensure that the former will be processed correctly on the target 
computer. Some of these fields are optional, or more strictly – 
information that they contain is not vital for the file. Thus, 
changing data bits in these fields most probably will not lead to 
errors while operating with the file. Such characteristics make 
these formats perfect containers [11].  
A vivid example is a virus Win95.CIH – specific malware 
which is embedded in *.exe files by using Portable Executable 
format features. This format includes a lot of additional data 
which are grouped according to their functions. Every group gets 
its own section in the file structure, and the size of the sections is 
predefined. If they are not entirely filled with data, it means the 
file contains a lot of spare space. For example, the first section is 
only for the PE header, so a big part of the virus uses it as a covert 
container [3]. 
2.2. Soft Tempest 
In fact, there are a lot of ways to covertly transmit necessary 
information to the target system. Not only harmless files but also 
network protocols can be used as efficient containers within the 
attacker’s steganography system. Nevertheless, necessary means 
depend on the final objective of the attack. If the goal is to steal 
data, there is need for both an inward and an outward information 
flow. Getting information into a system is important. A more 
interesting question, though, is how to get the stolen data out 
without raising suspicion of a legitimate user.  
While operating, every electronic device (including those 
inside a computer) gives off compromising emanations – 
electromagnetic emanations, which can be demodulated and 
accordingly processed to illegitimately get the critical information 
from them. These are called TEMPEST emanations after an 
American standard on the matter.  
Contemporary TEMPEST-based attacks tend to become more 
and more sophisticated as the countermeasures are being 
continuously enhanced, as well. Systems are contaminated 
with the malicious software which then conducts the search 
of necessary information (key data, passwords, specific files etc) 
and induces the leak through TEMPEST emanation. For example, 
if reception of the signal is the one from the monitor, then the 
information will be, say, amplitude modulated and sent as a visual 
picture to the monitor. The obvious disadvantage is that such 
an activity cannot be missed by an operator and will be deemed 
highly suspicious, which, on its part, will lead to finding and 
neutralizing the virus.  
M. Kuhn and R. Anderson conducted a series of experiment 
in which they shown a possible solution [9]. The human eye is 
more sensitive to low-frequency than to high-frequency vibrations, 
while TEMPEST receivers work vice versa. What is more, any 
devices primarily perceive luminosity in a linear way, while 
humans are more sensitive for the dark colours. This difference 
in sensitivity perception can be used to embed a message 
in the emanation and make it invisible to an unsuspecting user. 
The suggested method is to control and modify monitor dithering 
patterns. Pixels of two colours put in a check pattern are seen 
as a uniform colour, on the one side; on the other side, they create 
a high-frequency signal, which is best received by TEMPEST 
equipment with the following use of gamma-correction. Basically, 
the target computer is programmed so that it acts as a radio 
transmitter and emits a compound TEMPEST signal: a legitimate 
user observes one picture, and the attacker receives another – 
embedded – one on the monitor of his/her TEMPEST receiver. 
The only suggested method of counteraction, which is specific 
enough for this very type of attack, is still based on using the 
difference in perception sensitivity between humans and devices. 
TEMPEST fonts are designed with top 30% of the Fourier 
transform of the signal removed, which is most probably not 
noticed by a human eye, but makes it impossible to receive 
a strong TEMPEST signal [9]. Nevertheless, special equipment 
with necessary parameters (enhanced sensitivity to low-frequency 
emanations) might be designed, which will make the use of such 
fonts ineffective. 
2.3. Acoustic emanations as containers 
Electromagnetic fields are not the only by-product of the 
computer systems operation. A. Shamir and E. Tromer published 
the results of their research, in which they showed that computer 
emit high-pitched noise while operation, due to vibration in some 
of their electronic components [7].  
A series of experiments conducted by the scientist revealed 
that acoustic emanations can provide a potential attacker with 
information about what kind of software is currently running on 
the target system, as well as leak data on security-related 
parameters and computations. For example, loops of CPU 
instructions were highly distinguishable, and different RSA keys 
appeared to induce different sound patterns. To extract individual 
keys, the technic of acoustic cryptoanalysis was presented 
(applicable to GnuPG’s implementation of RSA). According to 
the results, it takes about an hour to extract full keys from a target 
computer,  irrespectively to their models and manufacturers. 
The key piece of equipment used for the attack is a microphone, 
and that of a mobile phone was demonstrated to be enough. Apart 
form acoustics, the scientists demonstrated a low-bandwidth 
attack, based on the same principles. The main difference was that 
the attacker had to get the leakage from ends of VGA, Ethernet, 
USB or other cables [7].  
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If electromagnetic emanations can be used as containers 
in steganography systems, acoustic waves can be, too. The first 
case could be based on the nature of sound perception itself – the 
classical steganography technic. Human hearing systems cannot 
distinguish slight variations in an acoustic flow. Here, any known 
method, mentioned above (Least Significant Bit, Echo-signal use 
etc) can be used to embed stolen information in parasitic sounds, 
emitted by the target computer. The second possible scenario is 
similar to the use of emanations in Soft Tempest. Sound dithering 
is a widely used method in music digital processing. The principle 
is the following: any piece of musical record might contain 
extensive frequency transitions that are too slow and smooth. This 
is where so called quantization noise can appear. If the level 
of frequency fluctuation is insignificant, the processing software 
simplifies the sound by removing the frequencies that exceed 
some medium limit. To cope with such a situation, special noises 
are generated and gradually added to the record. In music 
processing, this technic allows to achieve a natural sound lost 
during quantization. 
It is possible to suggest, that the same technic can be used 
in attacking steganography systems. The noise emitted by 
a computer is quite stable. It is not foiled by fan system noise, 
as critical acoustic signals appear to be mostly above 10 kHz, 
while a typical fan noise along with other noises lie in a much 
lower frequency band [7]. Task-switching is not a problem either, 
as it is the tasks that carry distinguishable acoustic spectral 
signatures. The same can be said about several computers working 
simultaneously in a closed space: they can be told apart using 
different sound patterns, as their depend on specific hardware, 
temperatures inside and outside the system, humidity, and other 
conditions. Thus, it acoustic emanations seem to be a sufficient 
container, while dithering can be accordingly modified and 
applied as an embedment method. 
The only suitable countermeasure seems to be the use 
of sound dampening equipment that can diminish the level 
of high-frequency leakage. As for means of active protection, 
strong wide-band noise source can serve for masking the critical 
data signals. Rough-scale behaving algorithms are another 
solution: despite somewhat diminishing the level of performance, 
they can thwart side-channel attacks by shuffling the signal and 
making it thus useless for the attacker [7]. In addition, electronic 
components of the system should be those of the highest quality, 
designed to reduce the level of acoustic and any other leakage.  
Nevertheless, at this point, efficiency of such protection 
methods is rather relevant, as sound-proving degrades other 
performance features along with being quite expensive. At the 
same time, due to the need of ventilation, there are still open parts 
in the cases, so their structure has to be constructed to shuffle 
outcoming noises very efficiently. 
3. Conclusion 
Stenganography is a powerful means of information 
protection. Nevertheless, it has to be also regarded as an 
instrument for a potential attacker, with all of the advantages 
turned threats.  
Compromising emanations of different physical nature are 
invisible and can only be noticed with the use of special 
equipment. Using steganography technics for the attacks ensures 
that the fact of using those emanations is efficiently hidden, and 
the system operations remains unsuspicious. This is exactly why 
there is need to consider technics described above a real threat for 
information and communication systems, and to join academic 
and technical potential to develop cost-effective and technically 
efficient counteracting means. 
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